

REMARKS

The present invention is a method for establishing a secure connection between a wireless communication apparatus and a data communication apparatus based on a wireless application protocol and a wireless communication apparatus for establishing a secure connection to a data communication apparatus based on a wireless application protocol, a memory card for establishing a secure connection between a wireless communication apparatus and a data communication apparatus based on a wireless application protocol, a system for establishing a secure connection when using a wireless application protocol, a wireless communication apparatus for establishing a secure connection to a data communication apparatus through a wireless network based on a wireless application protocol and a wireless communication device for receiving therein a separate unit with memory means, the device being operable to establish a secure connection with the data communication apparatus based on a wireless application protocol through a wireless communication network. In accordance with an embodiment of the invention, the wireless communication apparatus is connected to a separate unit. A wireless communication apparatus receives a public key and generates a master secret code. A signature may be calculated based on a chosen algorithm, the public key and the master secret code with the calculated signature being transmitted in a response to the data communication apparatus. The data communication apparatus upon reception of the response comprising the signature calculates the master secret code based on the chosen algorithm, the signature received and the public key and

establishes a secure connection to the wireless communication device. The communication apparatus thereafter saves the master secret code on a memory means in a data communication apparatus in order to reestablish the connection at a later occasion. The use of a separate unit such as a smart card in re-establishing a secure connection is that in the memory means therein information may be saved. See page 4, lines 9-15 of the specification. The present invention stores the calculated master secret key for a period of time and utilizes it by retrieval from the memory to re-establish a connection without performing the heavy computational establishment procedure anew. See page 3, lines 16-24 of the specification and page 17, lines 29 - 30 through page 18, lines 1-6 of the specification. The invention, by storing the master secret code, eliminates the requirement of the heavy computations required with the public key system by storing the master secret code in a memory means or database in order to re-establish the connection between the wireless communication apparatus and the data communication apparatus.

Each of the independent claims substantively recites that the data communication apparatus utilizes the stored master secret code to re-establish the connection between the data communication apparatus and the wireless communication apparatus at a later occasion. The subject matter is not taught by the prior art relied upon by the Examiner.

The drawings stand objected to regarding the caption "controller 18" in Fig. 2. A proposed drawing correction is submitted herewith where the modification of the

drawings to add to the legend reference to a "processor". Support for this addition is on page 18, lines 8-15.

A substitute specification is submitted herewith addressing the objections to the specification.

Claims 13 and 41 stand objected to as being of improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of previous claim. Claims 13 and 41 have been canceled.

Claims 4, 26 and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph as being indefinite. Claims 4, 26 and 27 have been amended to overcome the stated grounds of rejection.

Claims 1, 3, 19, 21-24 and 27-44 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103 as being unpatentable over WO 97/24831 (Ichikawa) further in view of EPO reference 0538216 (Anvret et al.). These grounds of rejection are traversed for the following reasons. Each of independent claims 1, 5, 15, 19, 22-24 and newly submitted claim 46 recite the combination of a secure connection between a wireless communication apparatus and a data communication apparatus in which the wireless communication apparatus is provided with storage such as a memory means including a separate unit which stores information to control access of the wireless communication apparatus through a wireless communication network connected to a data communication apparatus with the wireless communication apparatus calculating a master secret key which is transmitted to the data communication apparatus to set up a secure connection and thereafter the memory stores the

master secret code in order to re-establish the connection between the wireless communication apparatus and the data communication apparatus at a later occasion. This subject matter has no counterpart in the proposed combination of Ichikawa and Anvret et al. used in the rejection of claims 1, 3, 5, 15, 19, 21-24 and 27-44 and further in the rejection of claims 2, 20, 25, 26 and 45 over Ichikawa and Anvret et al. further in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,485,519 (Weiss). None of Ichikawa, Anvret et al. or Weiss teaches the aforementioned combination of a wireless communication apparatus which calculates or generates a master secret code which is utilized to initially secure connection between the wireless communication apparatus and the data communication apparatus and thereafter stores that master secret code in a memory of the wireless communication apparatus and utilizes the stored master secret code to re-establish the connection between the wireless communication apparatus and the data communication apparatus at a later time. Ichikawa teaches the utilization of a master key (MK) which is utilized to generate a derived key (DK). However the generation of the DK from the MK is performed each time connectivity occurs between the client 102 and the server 502. See page 10, lines 14 et. seq. where the operation of the process of Fig. 2 is described wherein it is seen that the calculation of the DK from the MK occurs simultaneously in both the client and the server which is fundamentally different than the sequence set forth in the independent claims. In this regard, the bottom of page 10 on lines 25 and 26 says "[s]uch processes occur in parallel within the client and in the server".

The citation of Anvret et al. by the Examiner does not suggest the aforementioned storage in the wireless device of a master secret code utilized for re-establishing the secure connection between the wireless device and the data communication apparatus at a later time. The cited portion of Anvret et al. merely describes well-known public and private keys which do not correspond to the stored master secret key. Finally, in the rejection of claims 2, 20, 25, 26 and 45, the Examiner relies upon Weiss and states that Weiss teaches a step of saving a master secret key in col. 12, lines 40-61. However, what Weiss describes is a private key which does not correspond to a master secret key as set forth in the claims. What Weiss describes is the removal of a private key a pre-determined period of time after the private key is originally generated and stored. However, this does not suggest the claimed utilization of the stored master key utilized in the re-establishment of a secure connection.

The dependent claims define more specific aspects of the present invention which are not rendered obvious by the combination of Ichikawa and Anvret et al. alone or further in combination with Weiss.

In view of the foregoing amendments and remarks, it is submitted that each of the claims in the application is in condition for allowance. Accordingly, early allowance thereof is respectfully requested.

To the extent necessary, Applicants petition for an extension of time under 37 CFR 1.136. Please charge any shortage in fees due in connection with the filing of this paper, including extension of time fees, or credit any overpayment of fees, to the


U.S. Application No. 09/720,971

deposit account of Antonelli, Terry, Stout & Kraus, LLP, Deposit Account No.

01-2135 (referencing attorney docket no. 1030.39437X00).

Respectfully submitted,

ANTONELLI, TERRY, STOUT & KRAUS, LLP

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald E. Stout", is written over a horizontal line.

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Attachment: Annotated Sheet Showing Changes
Substitute Specification
Marked-Up Copy of Specification

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


FIG. 1




FIG. 2

Secure session set up based on the Wireless Application Protocol

5 Technical Field of the Invention

The Wireless Application Protocol defines an industry-wide specification for developing applications that operate over wireless communication networks.

The wireless market is growing very quickly, and reaching new customers and services. To enable operators and manufacturers to meet the challenges in

10 advanced services, differentiation and fast/flexible service creation a set of protocols has been designed in transport, security, transaction, session and application layers.

Background of the Invention

15 WAP security functionality includes the Wireless Transport Layer Security (WAPWTLS) and application level security, accessible using Wireless Markup Language Script (WMLScript). For optimum security, some parts of the security functionality need to be performed by a tamper-resistant device, so that an attacker cannot retrieve sensitive data. Such data is especially the

20 permanent private keys used in WTLS handshake with client authentication, and for making application level electronic signatures (such as confirming an application level transaction). In WTLS, also master keys (master secrets) are relatively long living - which could be several days - this is in order to avoid frequent full handshakes where are quite heavy both computationally

25 and due to relatively large data transfer. Master secrets are used as a source

of entropy, to calculate MAC keys and message encryption keys which are used to secure a limited number of messages, depending on usage of WTLS.

~~US-A-5,530,741~~ US Patent 5,307,411 describes the set up of a secure communication session between two communication units, such as phones or facsimile machines. The secure session is controlled by separate smart cards based verification units associated with a respective one of the communication units. These two verification units exchange random ~~number~~numbers, encrypt these numbers by using private keys, and return the encrypted numbers to their origin. Then the encrypted random ~~number~~is numbers are decrypted based on public keys. If the received numbers correspond to the transmitted numbers, the parties verify each other and the secure session may take place. However, this requires that both communication units are provided with a smart card reader, which is not a necessary requirement in a server, like e.g. an Internet server. Thus, this document is quite restricting for the user, since it requires that both parties have a smart card reader, and is less suitable for communication between a wireless communication apparatus and a data communication apparatus. Also, every time a session is going to be established between the two communication apparatuses, an exchange of keys must be done.

Also, ~~US-A-5,371,794~~ US Patent 5,371,794, by Sun Microsystems, discloses a way to providing a secure wireless communication link between a mobile nomadic device and a base computing unit. The mobile device sends a host certificate to the base along with a randomly chosen challenge value (CH1)

and a list of supported shared key algorithms. The base sends ~~random a~~
random number (RN1) encrypted in the mobile's public key and an identifier
for the chosen algorithm back to the mobile. The base saves the RN1 value
and adds the CH1 value and the chosen algorithm to the mobile. The mobile
5 verifies the public key of the base the signature on the message. When the
public key is verified, the mobile determines the value of the RN1 by
decrypting the public key under the private key of the mobile. The mobile
then generates RN2 and a session key, and encrypts RN2 under the public
key of the base to the base. The base verifies and decrypting the RN2, and
10 determines the session key. Finally, the mobile and the base can enter a data
transfer phase using encrypted data which is decrypted using the session key
which is RN1 + RN2. The values of RN1 and RN2 are always derived from
the last key exchange, which may be from the initial connection setup or from
the last key change message, whichever is more recent. This means that
15 each time a data transfer is made, two new numbers are generated based on
RN1 and RN2, which will make the data transfer quite slow. Thus, as in US-
~~A-5,307,411~~US Patent 5,307,411, every time a session is going to be
established between the two apparatuses, in this case the mobile nomadic
device and the base computing unit, an exchange of keys must be done.

20

Summary of the Invention

The ~~main object of the present invention is to establish~~ establishes a secure
connection between a wireless communication apparatus and a data
25 communication apparatus based on a wireless application protocol.

~~Another object is to enable the~~ The user is enabled to re-establish a secure connection at a later occasion, since establishing a secure connection is a heavy procedure both computationally and due to intensive data transfer.

- 5 That is why, there is a need to use ~~the~~ a mutually agreed master secret for a relatively long time. The problem is to store the master key in a secure way. Partly due to that problem, it is common practice to restrict the lifecycle of the master secret and the associated secure session to ~~e.g.~~ for example, 24 hours, after which it is required to perform the heavy key establishment
- 10 procedure anew.

- The ~~main object is achieved in accordance with the~~ present invention by ~~connecting~~ connects a wireless communication apparatus, ~~e.g.~~ for example a cellular phone, to a separate unit, ~~e.g.~~ for example a smart card, a SIM
- 15 (Subscriber Identity Module) card, etc., which may store sensitive data of a secure connection. This means that the wireless communication apparatus having some kind of contact means, for example wireless (~~e.g.~~ for example infra-red, radio frequency, etc.) or physical (i.e. an electrical contact), for receiving information from the separate unit, ~~i.e.~~ that is the unit is provided with
- 20 memory means. The memory means comprises information to control an access of the wireless communication apparatus through a wireless communication network, ~~e.g.~~ for example a cellular phone network, connected to a data communication apparatus, ~~e.g.~~ for example a server, which supports a Wireless Application Protocol (WAP).

One advantage of using a separate unit, when establishing a secure connection, is that it will be much easier to re-establish a connection to the data communication apparatus. Thus, it is possible to save information, ~~e.g. for example~~ signatures, secret keys, etc., in the memory means, and may
5 be re-used in another secure connection. In order to avoid fraud, the re-use of a secure connection can be restricted for limited period of time. By saving this information in the memory means the second object will be achieved.

Another advantage is that the user pays less when re-establishing a secure
10 session, in case of necessary information to re-establishing is saved.

To establish a connection, the wireless communication apparatus connects to the separate unit, accessing the wireless communication network connected to said data communication apparatus. Then the wireless communication
15 apparatus transmits a request to the data communication apparatus. This request comprises information of which pre-defined algorithm(s) the wireless communication apparatus supports. When the data communication apparatus receives this request, it chooses at least one algorithm, associated with a public key and a private key, and transmits a message back to the
20 wireless communication apparatus. This message comprises the public key and information about which algorithm the data communication apparatus has chosen. When the wireless communication apparatus receives the message, comprising the public key, it will generate a master secret code, and calculates a signature based on the chosen algorithm, the public key and the
25 master secret code. Thereafter, the wireless communication apparatus will

transmit a ~~respond~~response to the data communication apparatus. This
~~respond~~response comprises the calculated signature. When the data
communication apparatus receives the ~~respond~~response, comprising the
signature, it will calculate the master secret code based on the chosen
5 algorithm, the signature received, and the private key. Finally the data
communication apparatus will be able to establish a secure connection to the
wireless communication apparatus.

In accordance with the first aspect of the present invention there is provided a
10 method for establishing a secure connection between a wireless
communication apparatus and a data communication apparatus based on a
wireless application protocol, wherein said wireless communication apparatus
has memory means including a separate unit comprising information to
control the access of the wireless communication apparatus through a
15 wireless communication network connected to said data communication
apparatus, comprising the following steps: connecting said wireless
communication apparatus to the separate unit, accessing the wireless
communication network connected to said data communication ~~apparatus~~
apparatus, the wireless communication apparatus transmits a request to the
20 data communication apparatus to establish a connection, said request
comprising information of which pre-defined algorithm(s) the wireless
communication apparatus supports, upon reception of said request, the data
communication apparatus chooses at least one algorithm associated with a
public and a private key, and transmits a message back to the wireless
25 communication apparatus, said message comprising the public key and

information about which algorithm the data communication apparatus has chosen, upon reception of the message comprising, the public key, the wireless communication apparatus generates a master secret code, and calculates a signature based on the chosen algorithm, the public key and the master secret code, and transmits a response to the data communication apparatus, said response comprising the calculated signature, upon reception of the ~~respond~~-response comprising the signature, the data communication apparatus calculates the master secret code based on the chosen algorithm, the signature received and the private key, and ~~establish~~-establishes a secure connection to the wireless communication apparatus, and saving said master secret code on said memory means and in the data communication apparatus, in order to re-establish the connection at a later occasion.

According to a second aspect of the present invention there is provided wireless communication apparatus for establishing a secure connection to a data communication apparatus based on a wireless application protocol, said wireless communication apparatus comprising: communication means for establishing a connection to a wireless communication network connected to said data communication apparatus, memory means including a separate unit provided with information to control the access of the data communication apparatus through the wireless communication network, means for generating a master secret code control means arranged to use a pre-defined algorithm(s) for generating a signature based on said master secret code and a public key received from said data communication apparatus, for use when the wireless communication apparatus establishes a secure connection to the

data communication apparatus, said memory means comprising a secure database for storing at least one master secret code and/or at least one signature related to one or more data communication apparatus, in order to re-establish a secure connection to a data communication apparatus.

5

According to a third aspect of the present invention there is provided memory card for establishing a secure connection between a wireless communication apparatus and a data communication apparatus based on a wireless application protocol, arranged to be connected to contact means, provided on
10 said wireless communication apparatus, for providing information from the memory card to the wireless communication apparatus upon establishing a secure session to a data communication apparatus, said information is arranged to control the access of the data communication apparatus through a wireless communication network, and to save a calculated master secret
15 related to one or more data communication apparatus, in order to re-establish a secure connection to a data communication apparatus.

Further advantages of the vane arrangement according to the present invention will be apparent from the dependent claims.

20

Brief Descriptions of the DrawingDrawings

Fig. 1 schematically illustrates a preferred embodiment of a hand portable phone according to the invention.

Fig. 2 schematically shows the essential parts of a telephone for communication with a cellular or cordless network.

Fig. 3 schematically shows how the secure session is set up between a client/phone and a server according to the invention.

Fig. 4 illustrates the message structure for setting up a secure connection according to the invention.

10 **Detailed Description of Embodiments**

Fig. 1 shows a preferred embodiment of a phone according to the invention, and it will be seen that the phone, which is generally designated by 1, comprises a user interface having a keypad 2, a display 3, an on/off button 4, a speaker 5, and a microphone 6. The phone 1 according to the preferred embodiment is adapted for communication via a cellular network, but could have been designed for a cordless network as well. The keypad 2 has a first group 7 of keys as alphanumeric keys, by means of which the user can enter a telephone number, write a text message (SMS), write a name (associated with the phone number), etc. Each of the twelve alphanumeric keys 7 is provided with a figure "0-9" or a sign "#" or "*", respectively. In alpha mode each key is associated with a number of letters and special signs used in text editing.

The keypad 2 additionally comprises two soft keys 8, two call handling keys 9, and a navigation key 10.

The two soft keys 8 have a functionality corresponding to what is known from the phones Nokia 2110™, Nokia 8110™ and Nokia 3810™. The functionality of the soft keys depends on the state of the phone and the navigation in the menu by using a navigation key. The present functionality of the soft keys 8 is shown in separate fields in the display 3 just above the keys 8.

The two call handling keys 9 according to the preferred embodiments are used for establishing a call or a conference call, terminating a call or rejecting an incoming call.

The navigation key 10 is an up/down key and is placed centrally on the front surface of the phone between the display 3 and the group of alphanumeric keys 7. Hereby the user will be able to control this key with his thumb. This is the best site to place an input key requiring precise motor movements. Many experienced phone users are used to one-hand handling. They place the phone in the hand between the finger tips and the palm of the hand. Hereby the thumb is free for inputting information.

Fig. 2 schematically shows the most important parts of a preferred embodiment of the phone, said parts being essential to the understanding of the invention. The preferred embodiment of the phone of the invention is adapted for use in connection with the GSM network, but, of course, the invention may also be applied in connection with other phone networks, such as cellular networks and various forms of cordless phone systems or in dual

band phones accessing sets of these systems/networks. The microphone 6 records the user's speech, and the analog signals formed thereby are A/D converted in an A/D converter (not shown) before the speech is encoded in an audio part 14. The encoded speech signal is transferred to the controller 18, which ~~i.a.~~ supports the GSM terminal software. The processor or controller 18 also forms the interface to the peripheral units of the apparatus, including a RAM memory 17a and a Flash ROM memory 17b, a SIM card 16, the display 3 and the keypad 2 (as well as data, power supply, etc.). The processor or controller 18 communicates with the transmitter/receiver circuit 19. The audio part 14 speech-decodes the signal, which is transferred from the processor or controller 18 to the earpiece 5 via an D/A converter (not shown).

The processor or controller 18 is connected to the user interface. Thus, it is the processor or controller 18 which monitors the activity in the phone and controls the display 3 in response thereto.

Therefore, it is the processor or controller 18 which detects the occurrence of a state change ~~even~~ event and changes the state of the phone and thus the display text. A state change event may be caused by the user when he ~~activates~~ activating the keypad including the navigation key 10, and ~~this type~~ these types of events ~~is~~ are called entry events or user events. However, the network communicating with the phone may also cause a state change event. This type of event and other events beyond the user's control are called non user events. Non user events comprise status change during call set-up,

change in battery voltage, change in antenna conditions, message on reception of SMS, etc.

5 An example of a tamper-resistant device is a smart card (SC). In the phone, it can be the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) or an external smart card.

The way ~~which~~ in which a phone and a smart card interact is specified as a command-response protocol. The goal of this protocol is to provide means for a WAP handset to utilize smart cards in performing WTLS and application
10 level security functions. The functionality presented here is based on the requirement that sensitive data, especially keys, can be stored in the card, and all operations where these key are involved can be performed in the card. Different classes of the cards are introduced to define how widely the functionality is implemented.

15

This specification is based on ISO7816 series of standards on smart cards. In particular, it uses the ISO7816-8 standard (draft) [ISO7816-8]. When this functionality is applied to GSM SIM there may be a need to extend also the related GSM specifications [GSM11.11], where applicable.

20

According to the invention the smart card 16 is used to enhance security of the implementation of the Security Layer and certain functions of the Application Layer. The smart card 16 can be used for several purposes for WTLS. The major purposes of the smart card 16 is to perform cryptographic
25 operations during the handshake, especially when the handshake is used for

client authentication. Furthermore, the memory of the smart card 16 is used for securing a master secret, a public key and other type of confidential material during long-living WTLS sessions. Finally the memory of the smart card 16 is used for recording the level of security of the sessions. According to the invention the WTLS support in a smart card 16 can be described with reference to the following three embodiments.

First embodiment

According to this embodiment, the smart card 16 is used for storage of permanent, typically certified, private keys for performing operations using these keys. The operations include signing operations (e.g. for example, ECDSA or RSA) for client authentication when needed for the selected handshake scheme; key exchange operations using a fixed client key (e.g. for example, ECDH key, in ECDH_ECDSA handshake).

The smart card 16 is not required to perform the calculation of the master secret or operations using the master key. These calculations may advantageously be performed by the processor or controller 18 of the phone. However, the smart card 16 may act as a persistent storage for WTLS secure session (and connection) data, including master secrets. In this case, master secrets would be calculated and used for key derivation in the volatile phone memory (the RAM 17a) but erased from there when not needed at that moment, e.g. for example, when the user exits from secure WAP applications. Not storing session data persistently in phone 1 may improve security, e.g. for

example, in the case of a stolen phone 1. It also brings better usability in the case of changing the smart card 16 from one phone 1 to another.

Additionally, for portability, the smart card 16 may store needed certificates.

- 5 Storage of trusted root certificates (or public keys) has significance also from security point of view: they must not be altered - but they can be exposed without danger.

Note that when the public key encryption based key exchange (e.g. for example, RSA) is used according to the first embodiment of the invention, there is no advantage in doing public key encryption on the smart card 16 when the pre-master secret would be returned to the phone 1, for master secret calculation in the controller 18.

- 15 When client authentication is not supported in WTLS, at the minimum, the smart card 16 only acts as a storage for session data. If client authentication is supported, the card would be able to perform a signing operation based on a private key (e.g. for example, ECDSA or RSA) stored in the card, or key agreement calculation (e.g. for example, ECDH) based on a fixed key stored in the card.

Second embodiment

According to the second embodiment, the smart card 16 is used as a tamper resistant device for all crypto-critical functionality: storage of all persistent

- 25 keys and operations using these keys. Besides the operations performed

according the first embodiment, the smart card 16 now also support the calculation (ECDH key exchange) or generation (RSA key exchange) of the pre-master secret; calculation and storage of the master secret for each secure session; and derivation and output of key material (for MAC,
5 encryption keys, IV, finished check), based on the master secret.

The phone 1 stores MAC and message encryption keys as long as they are currently needed. These keys have a limited lifetime which may be negotiated during the WTLS handshake - in the extreme case they are used
10 for a single message only. The phone 1 has to delete ~~the~~ the keys from its RAM memory 17a when the user exits from the secure WAP applications. These keys can always be derived anew from the master secret if needed.

An attacker who obtains a message encryption key can read as many
15 messages as is agreed in the key refresh configuration (in the extreme case, a single message). An attacker who obtains a MAC key can impersonate the compromised party during as many messages as is agreed in the configuration (in the extreme case, a single message).

20 Third embodiment.

Certain specialized smart cards 16 may act as full-blown security engines for WTLS. This requires that the smart card 16 is equipped with its own processing unit and only uses the phone 1 as an interface to the cellular network during the secure session set up or the handshake procedure.
25 Besides the operations according to the second embodiment, the smart card

16 may store the MAC and encryption keys for each secure connection; and perform MAC calculation/verification and encryption/decryption of messages.

Furthermore, the smart card 16 may be responsible for the verification of
5 certificates and the verification of digital signatures.

Note that having message encryption in the smart card 16 does not necessarily bring any additional security because in any case the data is as plain text in the phone 1. The same is true for MAC calculation: the phone 1
10 must be trusted to input and output data in a correct way. The only advantage here would be not having to take encryption keys out of the card 16.

However, the keys have a limited lifetime which is negotiated during the WTLS handshake - in the extreme case they are used for single message only. According to the third embodiment, the smart card 16 will contain all
15 algorithms so that they could be controlled by smart card issuers.

Smartcard.

The term "smartcard" covers a card-like unit having some memory means in which some secret information identifying the card holder is stored. The
20 memory means may be a magnet strip that may be read by a magnet reader, or it may be provided as discrete memory components as a ROM, EEPROM, etc. When the user inserts the smart card in a more or less public apparatus ~~he~~the user may become authorized to perform some operations such as banking operations. Presently the user of a GSM phone is identified by a so-
25 called Subscriber Identity Module or a SIM card 16, and the structure of this

type of smart card is defined in the GSM specification "Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM - ME) interface", GSM 11.11 version 5.5.0, published by European Telecommunications Standards Institute; ETSI. The present type of smartcards will be able to support the first
5 embodiment explained above.

Gemplus has recently launched a smartcard, GemXpresso RAD, based on a 32-bit chip from Texas Instruments using ARM7 RISC core technology. This 32 bit RISC processor has a 32 kbyte of non volatile flash memory and 8
10 kbyte of ROM. When the mechanical interface of the Gemplus card is adapted to fulfill the GSM specification this type of smartcard will be able to support the second and the third embodiment.

Network.

15 Fig. 3 schematically shows how the secure session, ~~i.e.~~ that is a secure connection, between a data communication apparatus and a wireless communication apparatus, ~~e.g.~~ for example a cellular phone 1. Basically the WAP content and applications are specified in a set of well-known content formats based on the familiar WWW content formats. Content is transported
20 using a set of standard communication protocols based on the WWW communication protocols. A browser in the phone 1 co-ordinates the user interface and is analogous to a standard web browser.

The wireless communication apparatus 1 is a client 1 who wants to establish
25 a secure connection to a server 20,30,40, which is the data communication

apparatus 20, 20, 30, 30, 40. The client is provided in an environment, which make it possible to reach a wide variety of different wireless platforms, e.g. for example world wide web (WWW). The environment provided may be referred to as Wireless Application Environment (WAE). This means that the client 1

5 may be supported by some kind of browser, e.g. for example a micro-browser, to access the different services connected to the server. In order to access these services the browser may comprise the following functionalities:

- Wireless Markup Language (WML) - a lightweight markup language, similar to HTML, but ~~optimised~~ optimized for use in hand-held mobile

10 terminals;

- WMLScript - a lightweight scripting language, similar to JavaScript™;
- Wireless Telephony Application (WTA, WTAI) - telephony services and programming interfaces; and
- Content Formats - a set of well-defined data formats, including images,

15 phone book records and calendar information.

The server 20 is using a wireless application protocol, and may comprise a gateway 30 and an origin server 40. The gateway 30 is also a server, which may identify and encrypt/decrypt information between the client 1 and the

20 origin server 40. This means that the gateway is provided with encoders and decoders (not shown). Also, the server 20 comprises different algorithms to make the encryption/decryption. The encryption/decryption itself may be performed by well-known methods, e.g. for example RSA, Diffie-Hellman, etc. The origin server 40 comprises different scripts to support WAP and data to

be accessed by the client. This data may be all kind of information, e.g. for example weather reports, news, information from stock markets, etc.

In order to access the server 20, from the client 1, the server has to be
5 connected to a wireless communication network 50, e.g. for example a cellular phone network. Therefore, in accordance with the present invention, the client is provided with contact means (not shown) for receiving information from a separate unit (not shown) provided with memory means. This separate unit may be a smart card, subscriber identity module (SIM), or the
10 like. The memory means may be a random access memory (RAM), read only memory (ROM), or the like. Further, the memory means comprises information to control the access of the server 20 through the wireless communication network 50.

15 To establish a secure connection, the client 1 connects to the separate unit, accessing the wireless communication network 50 connected to the server 20. Then the client 1 transmits an encrypted request 60 through the gateway 30. This encrypted request 60 comprises information of which pre-defined algorithm(s) the client 1 supports. When the gateway 30 receives this
20 encrypted request 60, it sends 70 the encrypted request to the origin server 40. The origin server 40 chooses at least one algorithm, associated with a public key and a private key, and transmits a message 80 back to the gateway 30. The gateway encrypts the message and ~~send~~sends it 90 to the client 1. This message 90 comprises the public key information about which
25 algorithm the server 20 has chosen. When the client 1 receives the encrypted

message 90, comprising the public key, it will generate a master secret code, and calculates a signature based on the chosen algorithm, the public key and the master secret code. Thereafter, the client 1 will transmit an encrypted ~~respond-response~~ 65 to the gateway 30. This encrypted ~~respond-response~~

5 65 comprises the calculated signature. When the gateway 30 receives the encrypted ~~respond-response~~ 80, comprising the signature, it will decrypt the ~~respond-response~~ 75 and send it to the origin server 40. The origin server will calculate the master secret code based on the chosen algorithm, the signature received, and ~~the-its~~ private key. Finally, the origin server 40 sends
10 a final message 85 to the client through the gateway 30. If the origin server 40 has accepted the client 1 request 60, the server will be able to establish a secure connection between the origin server 40 and the client 1, else the connection will be terminated.

15 Setting up a secure connection.

Fig. 4 illustrates the message structure for setting up a secure connection according to the invention.

The cryptographic parameters of the secure session are produced by the
20 WTLS Handshake Protocol, which operates on top of the WTLS Record Layer. When a WTLS client and server first start communicating, they agree on a protocol version, select cryptographic algorithms, optionally authenticate each other, and use public-key encryption techniques to generate a shared secret.

The WTLS Handshake Protocol is described Wireless Transport Layer Security Specification dated 30. April 1998 and is part of the Wireless Application Protocol.

5 The WTLS Handshake Protocol involves the following sequence of steps.

When the a WAP session has been set between the phone 1 (the client) and the server 20 (~~e.g. for example~~ a bank), and the client (phone 1) wants to establish a secure connection ~~he~~ the client sends a client hello message 100 as ~~his~~ the first message. This message includes a key exchange list that

10 contains the cryptographic key exchange algorithms supported by the client in decreasing order of preference. In addition, each entry defines the certificate or public key the client wishes to use. The server will select one or, if no acceptable choices are presented, return a handshake_failure alert and close the secure connection.

15

In response to the client hello message ~~400-100,~~ the server 20 will send a server hello message 101 when it was able to find an acceptable set of algorithms. If it cannot find such a match, it must respond with a handshake_failure alert. The server hello message 101 will identify the

20 session and set up the parameters need for the session.

The server 20 will furthermore transmit a server certificate message 102. The server certificate message 102 will always immediately follow the server hello message 101, and the purpose of this server certificate message 102 is to

25 identify the cryptation algorithm selected by the server from the key exchange

list included in the client hello message 100. The server certificate message 102 will include a so-called certificate carrying a public key for the selected encryption algorithm. The server certificate message 102 includes information about issuer of the certificate, the beginning and the end of the validity period, and parameters relevant or the public key. The server controls the validity period and when the granted validity period is expired the client has to renew the secure connection. The length of the validity period will typically be in the level of a week or more. The maximum number of session will also have to be defined.

10

A Server Key Exchange Message 103 will be send as a third message immediately after the server certificate message 102. The server key exchange message 103 is ~~optionally~~ optional and will be sent by the server 20 only when the server certificate message 102 does not contain enough data to allow the client 1 to exchange a pre-master secret. This message 103 conveys cryptographic information to allow the client to communicate the pre-master secret: either an RSA public key to encrypt a secret with, or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman parameters with which the client can complete a key exchange (with the result being the pre-master secret). As additional Key Exchange Suites are defined for WTLS which include new key exchange algorithms, the server key exchange message will be sent if and only if the certificate type associated with the key exchange algorithm does not provide enough information for the client to exchange a pre-master secret.

20

Also a ~~forth~~fourth message - a Server Certificate message 104 - is
optionallyoptional. This message 104 requests a certificate from the client, if
appropriate for the selected cipher suite. This message will immediately
follow the Server Certificate message 102 and Server Key Exchange
5 message 103.

In order to inform the client that the server has ended of the Server Hello
session, it transmits a Server Hello Done message 105. After sending this
message 105 the server 20 will wait for a client response. This message
10 indicates that the server 20 has ~~send~~sent messages to support the key
exchange, and that the client 20 can proceed with its phase of the key
exchange. Upon receipt of the server hello done ~~message~~messages the
client should verify that the server provided a valid certificate if required and
check that the server hello parameters are acceptable.

15

If the server 20 asks for an Client Certificate message 107, the client 1 has to
transmit such a after receiving a Server Hello Done message 105. This
message is only sent if the server 20 requests a certificate. If no suitable
certificate is available, the client must send a certificate message containing
20 no certificates. If client authentication is required by the server for the
handshake to continue, it may respond with a fatal handshake_failure alert.
Client certificates are sent using the Certificate structure defined previously for
server certificates.

Now the phone 1 or the client starts to calculate a 20 byte random number to be used as a Master Secret 106 for the secure sessions. The master secret 106 is used to derive key material needed for Message Authentication Code (MAC) keys and data encryption keys. MAC and data encryption provide data integrity and privacy between communicating parties. A public key based key establishment is a heavy procedure both computationally and due to intensive data transfer. That is why, there is a need to use the mutually agreed master secret 106 for a relatively long time.

10 The processor or ~~the~~ controller 18 of the phone 1 calculates the master secret. A smart card, e.g. the SIM card 16, which can be regarded as a tamper resistant device, is used for storage of the sensitive data of the secure session, and performing operations using that sensitive data, so that this data never leaves the card. In practice the secure information will be transferred
15 from the SIM card 16 to the working RAM 17a of the processor 18 but these information will be overwritten when no session is ongoing or when the phone 1 is switched off.

According to the first embodiment of the ~~invention~~ invention, the controller or
20 processor 18 performs the operations needed for the key establishment, e.g. for example, Diffie-Hellman calculation or RSA encryption and complementary calculations. Then the controller 18 persistently stores the resulting secret key (master secret 106) in the SIM card 16. Then the controller 18 performs the key derivation based on the master secret 106 and
25 additional data (e.g. for example, seed), producing key material for MAC

calculation and encryption. The key derivation function is security protocol specific. It is typically based on some secure hash function, e.g. for example, SHA-1.

- 5 Preferably the SIM card 16 is provided as a smart card having its own processor, whereby both the operations needed for performing the key establishment and the key derivation based on the master secret may be performed inside the smart card. Then the master secret, and data used to calculate it, would never have to leave smart card. So, the secure session
10 associated with the master secret can be used during a long period.

- A Client Key Exchange Message 108 will immediately follow the client certificate message 107, if it is sent. Otherwise it will be the first message sent by the client 1 after it receives the Server Hello Done message 105. With
15 this message 108, a pre-master secret is set, either through direct transmission of the RSA-encrypted secret, or by the transmission of EC Diffie-Hellman public key which will allow each side to agree upon the same pre-master secret.

- 20 Then the Master Secret 106 is encrypted by using the public key from the server's certificate and the agreed RSA algorithm. The result is send to the server 20 in an encrypted master secret message 109.

- A Certificate Verify message 110 is used to provide explicit verification of a
25 client certificate. This message is only sent by the client following a client

certificate Message 107 that has signing capability (~~i.e. that is~~, RSA certificates).

Both ends has to send finished messages 111 and 112 at the end of the
5 handshake to verify that the key exchange and authentication processes were successful.

The finished messages 111 and 112 ~~is~~are the first messages protected with the just-negotiated algorithms, keys, and secrets. Recipients of finished
10 messages must verify that the contents are correct. Once a side has sent its ~~Finished~~finished message and received and validated the ~~Finished~~finished message from its peer, it may begin to send and receive application data 113 over the secure connection. It is a critical or fatal error if a finished message is not preceded by a change cipher spec message at the appropriate point in
15 the handshake.

The value handshake_messages includes all handshake messages starting at client hello up to, but not including, this finished message. The handshake_messages for the finished message sent by the client will be
20 different from that for the finished message sent by the server, because the one which is sent second will include the prior one.

As long as a secure connection is valid application data session 113 may be initiated just by using Client Hello messages 100 and Server Hello messages
25 101.

Acronyms.

	APDU	Application Protocol Data Unit
	API	Application
5	CA	Certification Authority
	CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
	DF	Dedicated File
	DH	Diffie-Hellman
	EC	Elliptic Curve
10	ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
	ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
	ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
	EF	Elementary File
	GSM	Global System for Mobile Communication
15	IV	Initialization Vector
	MAC	Message Authentication Code
	ME	Management Entity
	OSI	Open System Interconnection
	PDU	Protocol Data Unit
20	PRF	Pseudo-Random Function
	SAP	Service Access Point
	SDU	Service Data Unit
	SHA-1	Secure Hash Algorithm
	SIM	Subscriber Identity Module
25	SMS	Short Message Service

	SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
	TLS	Transport Layer Security
	WAP	Wireless Application Protocol
	WML	Wireless Markup Language
5	WMLScript	Wireless Markup Language Script
	WDP	Wireless Datagram Protocol
	WSP	Wireless Session Protocol
	WTLS	Wireless Transport Layer Security
	WTP	Wireless Transaction Protocol

10

The list above includes the acronyms used in the present text. Detailed discussion and explanation of the acronyms may be found in the technical specification defining the Wireless Application Protocol on the Internet homepage for WAPFORUM, <http://www.wapforum.org/>.